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To review Edith Stein's Eine 
Unknuchung /iber den Staat on the 
occasion of its translation into 
Engbsh by Marianne Sawicki makes 
one realize that the investigation has 
not lost its relevance in the 83 years 
since its first publication. Stein's 
awareness of intersubjective 
constitution (often today called 'social 
construction') makes the treatise seem 
strikingly up to date: hers is a 
perspective that combines 
phenomenology in its most classical 
form with insights that have often 
been thought to pertain to the post- 
modern era. 
The translation leaves nothing 
to be desired: foomotes of an 
explanatory nature clarify the text 
throughout and terms are rendered 
consistently and with insight. Thus 
the text is brought to us clean and 
accessible, and the reviewer's task is 
therefore more meaningfully 
concentrated on articulating what is in 
the text 
The project of phenomenology 
as laid out in Husserl's programmatic 
Ideas includes both constitutional and 
eidetic analyzes; analyzes of how things 
are experienced and analyzes of whatit 
is that is thus experienced. A n  
Inveshgah'on Concerning the State, as it 
concerns an inter-subjectively 
constituted entity characterized 
precisely by exhibiting in its turn a 
specific type of intersubjective 
constitution (i.e. law-making), 
combines these two types of analysis 
searnlessly, as what is investigated 
cannot be investigated without being 
constituted. Although this is the case 
for al l  things in their objectivity, the 
inseparability of the two types of 
analysis is more obvious when we deal 
with social phenomena, and it is in 
this area particularly that the addition 
provided by Stein to Husserl's 
phenomenology in her doctoral 
dissertation On the Pmblem o f  Eqbafby 
matters most. 
In A n  Invesfigation concerning the 
State, Stein attempts to make available 
for intuition the essence (the eidos) of 
the state, i.e. answer the simple 
question which nevertheless requires a 
comprehensive answer: 'what is the 
state? Her analysis d only be fully 
understood on the background of her 
earlier works On the Problem ofEqathy 
and the Philosophy o f  Pgchology and the 
Humanidees, as these works respectively 
ground and explain the structure of 
intersubjectivity, of which the state is 
precisely 'a state'. But her description 
of the state can easily be recognized, 
even without prior knowledge of 
these works. 
The state is tremendously 
important for our understanding of 
the social world. In fact the state so 
easily serves as a point of reference 
for our understanding of the world, in 
its historical as well as in its 
geographical dimensions, that we tend 
to forget it could be otherwise. To 
Stein, however, the state is not: 
necessary: it does not arise by 
necessity, nor is it necessarily arising 
from the essence of human beings. It: 
is in fact possible for human beings to 
live in community without living in 
states. Nevertheless, particular 
communities, when constituting 
themselves as characterized by a 
particular type of value response (i.e. 
when they share a culture and is 
culturally creative), have a tendency to 
consolidate themselves by giving 
themselves the possibility for unified 
action in lawmaking. The state is in 
fact, in Stein's view, essentially sovereign 
hmaking and all that it is apart from 
this is to be understood in relation to 
this central feature. Hence state = 
lawmaking, and lawmaking, to be 
what it is, is necessarily sovereign. 
Once sovereignty has been 
established, however, the community 
it rules may well change character, so 
that the state can be seen to have a 
life that is dstinct from that of the 
community (the Polish state and the 
Polish nation have distinct histories), 
although it depends on the 
community in many ways. Stein's 
careful analysis of the distinction and 
interdependence of nation (people) 
and state forms part of the reason 
why her work might hnd new readers 
today among phenomenologists and 
social or political scientists in quest of 
systematic work based on sustainable 
dehnitions of social realities. 
The book under review is 
about what the state is. As such it is 
divided into two parts: 'the ontic 
fabric of the state' and 'the state from 
perspectives of value', concerning, 
respectively, the structure and value of 
the state. The first part is divided into 
three; the &st concerned with the 
civil community that underlies the 
state or for whom the state obtains; 
the second with the relation between 
state, legislation and law, and the third 
with the dependence of the state on 
factors foreign to its essence. The 
second part looks at the value of the 
state for the individuals who belong 
to it, the relationship of this value to 
(their) moral values and the value they 
might place on religion. 
Stein starts by situating the state as a 
social pattern in relation to the social 
patterns of mass, association and 
community, farmliar from her 
Individual and Communig (forming the 
second part of PhihsopLy of Psycholo8 
and the Humanitis)), and makes it clear 
that the state is a specific type of 
community-organization, and not 
simply an association created by 
individuals, as contract theory would 
have it. Too many aspects of concrete 
state-formation militate against that 
idea: states are not just invented. It 
rather emerges from communities, 
and hence depends on these for its 
initial formation. The unity of the 
state is constituted by its lawmaking 
(with its corollaries of reinforcement, 
adjudication and regulation), but 
although the civil community requires 
no ethic community in order to be, 
the value of the state may depend on 
the provisions it makes for allowing 
the community to be culturally 
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Ps such the state is value 
neutral: all that pertains to its essence 
is the requirement to stay in charge. If 
it relinquishes its ability to legislate 
and reinforce its laws, it looses itself. 
Stein gives a very interesting 
analysis of the state's relationship to 
super-ordinate, coordinate and 
subordinate social patterns, where the 
distinctiveness of the state among 
communities of various extensions is 
seen to reside precisely in its 
sovereignty. Whether or not the state 
obtains at one or other level of 
extension (at the national level or the 
European one, for example) depends 
on this feature. If sovereignty forms 
part of the state's extension it pertains 
to the essence of the state to work for 
its integration. The obedience the 
state requires from its citizens for 
integration to take place and 
sovereignty to be possible therefore 
often conflict with other claims on 
their loyalty. But as it is not in the 
interest of the state to push 
individuals towards a conflict of 
conscience (as this conflict is liable to 
weaken or destabilize the state), it is in 
accordance with the idea of the state 
to allow, as far as possible, for 
religious freedom and the freedom of 
conscience. 
Turning to lawmaking as the 
essence of the state @art I, 5 2), Stein 
distinguishes between positive law 
and pure law (which again is 
distinguished from 'natural' and 'good 
old' law). The idea of pure law, 
inherited from Adolf Reinach, is seen 
as subsisting 'independently of any 
choice and independently of whether 
or not it's recognised by any 'law in 
force". Positive law, in contrast, 'is 
created or put into effect through 
deliberate acts'. The two have in 
common their form as law, as all law 
daims to regulate the behaviour of 
persons, but what they command may 
differ. As the will can base itself on 
insight into values to set about 
realizing them, the lawmaker can 
make operative pure law. Likewise the 
will of the individual person can set 
about realizing values without regard 
to their relative motivating power and 
the legislator can make laws that are 
not in accordance with pure law. Stein 
thus sees pure law as an analogue to 
the value world - both are objective 
in that insight can be gained of them. 
But insight isn't necessary; it has to be 
acquired. One can be wrong about the 
relationships of pure law and values. 
Natural right (understood 
accordmg to contract-theory as a right 
of which subjects can divest 
themselves and invest in the state by 
founding it) does not exist, accordmg 
to Stein: pure law subsists 
independently of the establishment of 
the state and is unaffected by it @. 
51). Nor is there any more authority 
to 'good old law' as positive law, no 
matter how old, may or may not 
coincide with pure law, and it is this 
coinciding that determines its value 
@. 83). It is because we assume that 
what is right always holds steady that 
we think old law should not be 
tampered with. But this assumption 
overlooks the distinction between 
pure law and positive law (in the same 
way as one could overlook the 
distinction between what ought to be 
done and what always has been done), 
and in so far as the idea of positive 
law is not grasped, the idea of the 
state cannot be grasped either @. 84). 
The state as legislator must 
finally be seen in relation to 
international law. The latter cannot 
smctly speaking be seen to reside in 
treatises, as these are in need of legal 
regulation (the prerogative of the 
state) for their reinforcement. To the 
extent, therefore, that international 
law 'does not have a pure law 
character' and is reduced to treatises, 
'it is not to be regarded as positive 
law'. To make international law 
positive law the corporate body of 
states either 'constitutes itself as a 
sovereign civil authority - thereby 
destroying the single states; or on the 
authorization of one of the single 
states it appoints itself as a super- 
ordinate authority - which would 
have the same consequence. Or else 
the body derives its mandate from the 
single states. Then the whole thing 
looks different' @. 91). In that case 
ratification by member states ensures 
that international law is also positive 
law in the member states. Then the 
body 'doesn't have the potentiality of 
enacting collective regulations for all 
participating states. The persons 
belonging to it can only discuss and 
decide collectively what each state 
singly should regulate for its own 
state. Discussion and decision are 
matters for the corporate body. 
Conversely, regulations are a matter 
for the state on its own. Through 
them, each state binds only its own 
state. (. . .) This is in fact the only 
possible way to have a standardization 
in positive law of transactions among 
a plurality of commonwealths that is 
compatible with their existence as 
states. (. . .) With these as with all other 
regulations, the state retains the 
freedom to suspend them all by itself, 
on its own, without the participation 
of those states with which it 
collectively decided to issue them. For 
a decision has no legally binding 
power. To dissociate itself from a 
decision may be unwise and might be 
immoral [.., but] in no way is it a 
breach of the law.' @. 92). This long 
quotation serves to show how the 
contemplation of the essence of the 
state can serve to delimit practical 
possibilities, even before they are tried 
out in practice. The rise of the UNO 
and human rights law 25 years after 
the publication of this investigation in 
fact followed the path thus 
prescribed. In this manner eidetic 
analysis as conducted by Stein is in no 
way either unworldly or impractical - 
on the contrary it allows for looking 
at things as they are, which is 
necessary for any action to succeed. 
As Stein moves on to discuss 
the extrinsic conditions for the state 
(I, § 3), she reiterates that the 
community underlies the state, but 
that the latter cannot simply be 
reduced to the former, although 
linked to a preceding development 
consisting largely in the elaboration of 
social institutions and the evolution of 
customs @. 109-11). The state's 
sphere of influence on the lives of its 
citizens is not limited in principle (it 
may even regulate daily life), but a 
certain auto-limitation is in the 
interest of stability, as otherwise 
individuals will become frustrated and 
rebel against the state @. 116). Thus 
the state often leaves communities 
(families, associations) regulate 
themselves, as long as it can stay in 
control. The state, in fact, is 
dependent on the recognition of its 
claim to control by the individuals, 
and not only on recognition from 
'within', but also on recogrution from 
other states, although 'the state can 
subsist only by virtue of its own 
proper right' @. 120-1). The state is 
also dependent - to the extent that its 
citizens are persox 
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citizens are persons extended in space 
as human beings are by virtue of their 
body - on having a territory on which 
its citizens can live, i.e. that can 
sustain the economy and with it their 
needs. The state finally is dependent 
on a certain 'segmentation by status' 
of the members to the extent that 
labour needs to be divided for the 
economy to work and the state 
functions to be upheld (defence, 
government, policing and 
adjudication). Stein finishes her 
account of the dependence of the 
state on factors extrinsic to its essence 
with a discussion of the impact 
various theories of the state has on its 
perception by the citizens, i.e. to what 
extent theories of the state 
(ideologies) can form part of the 
state's means of shaping itself by 
policy. Ideologies account for the 
unity of different pames competing 
for control of the government, and 
they can in fact influence the state to 
the point of legally adopting its 
abolition. The state is constituted 
inter-subjectively from inhviduals' 
perception of it, and how they 
conceptualize the state thus 
contribute to shape it. How they see it 
cannot alter its essence however (as it 
is constituted from the fact that they 
constitute it), and it is to the value of 
National Univer~zo #Ireland, Moynooth 
this essence that Stein turns in the 
second part. 
The question of the value of the state 
amounts to the question of its 
justification. Not the justification of 
this or that particular state pattern, 
but of the state as such If the state 
was necessarily useful, allowing for 
mental development of individuals 
and/or securing justice it would have 
value as such, but this does not seem 
to be the case: states can be 
destructive and unjust. The state 
could be said to be of value if it was 
the only way for a community to form 
- given that it is of value for the 
individual to live in community - but 
the state is not the only possible 
community. Insofar however, as the 
state organizes the community and 
allows for its cultural creativity, it has 
a derivative value. In this way Stein 
considers the value of the state as 
deriving from the value of the 
community it allows develop as a 
cultural unity. 
This possibly makes Stein a 
communitarian, and one worth taking 
account of because her definitions are 
so carefully thought out. The 
translation of her work enables such 
taking account, and it must therefore 
be welcomed 
Mette Lebech 
